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Book Reviews
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM. By Steven D. Smith.! Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. 174. Hardcover,
$38.00.

Steffen N. Johnson2
One hallmark of successful scholarship is its ability to take a
seemingly outrageous proposition and make it seem obvious. By
this standard, Steven D. Smith's Foreordained Failure: The Quest
for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom is a success.
Professor Smith advances two such propositions: first, that the
Constitution's framers envisioned the religion clauses not as substantive provisions, but as a single jurisdictional provision
designed to leave the substance of religious freedom to the
states; and second, that an adequate substantive theory of religious freedom is impossible. Smith's claims run against the grain
of virtually all modern church-state theory. Nonetheless, he
makes a compelling case for both propositions.
Part I of this Review discusses Foreordained Failure's historical argument-that the First Amendment embodies no substantive principle of religious liberty. I argue that even if Smith is
right to conclude that the primary purpose of the religion clauses
was jurisdictional, this conclusion does not obviate the need to
determine the clauses' substantive scope. Jurisdiction is a synonym for authority, and someone must still determine what Congress lacks jurisdiction to do.
Part II addresses Smith's second, more theoretical argument-that a general theory of religious freedom is impossible.
Upon examination, it is clear that what Smith is really arguing is
that a genuinely "neutral" theory of religious freedom is impossible. But even if perfect neutrality is elusive, it does not follow
1.
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that the project of theorizing about religious liberty is hopeless.
Rather, Smith's argument suggests we might reconsider when
neutrality is possible and whether it is a proper objective of our
religion clause jurisprudence.
Part III briefly explores a few of the broader implications
and ironies of Smith's two theses.
I.

SMITH'S HISTORICAL ARGUMENT: THE
"ESSENTIAL FEDERALISM" OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES

Smith's historical argument begins with a claim few judges
and scholars would dispute: that the religion clauses were "an
exercise in federalism." (p. 18) Many have commented on the
religion clauses' federalist character, (p. 18 nn.4 & 5 (collecting
authorities)) and as many others have observed the difficulties
attending their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.3
The problem, says Smith, is the "virtually ubiquitous" assumption "that the religion clauses contain both a federalist element
and a substantive principle or right and that their substantive
content can be extracted and elaborated independently of the
clauses' federalism." (p. 18) (emphasis added) For Smith, this
"dualistic view of the religion clauses" is mistaken. "The religion
clauses," he argues, "were not a hybrid creation-part federalism, part substantive right. They were, rather, simply an assignment of jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states-no
more, no less." (p. 18)
In advancing this argument, Smith suggests it is helpful to
remember that the founders grappled with two sorts of questions.
The first sort of question-"What is the proper relation between
religion and government?"-might be thought of as "first-order"
or "substantive." Smith terms this inquiry the "'religion question."' The second sort of question-"Which level of government, state or national, should be responsible for addressing the
first-order question?"-might be thought of as a "second-order"
question. Smith calls it the "'jurisdiction question.'" (p. 19)
The rest, Smith says, is simply history. It is common knowledge that the founders' views on the religion question were di3. In the Postscript to Chapter Four, Smith briefly discusses how the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment bears on his conclusions. (50-54) For an argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended in part to extend the substantive protections of the
First Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106, 1145-56
(1994).
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vergent: some, motivated by a perception that religion was vital
to orderly society, deemed government support for religion desirable;4 (pp. 19-20) others, motivated by the same perception,
opposed such support for fear that it would undermine true religious devotion.s (p. 20) Still others may have opposed support
for religion, albeit less openly, on the ground that religion was
unhelpful or detrimental to society. In short, the founders fundamentally disagreed over the proper relation between religion and
government, yet the religion clauses passed with relatively little
debate. Smith attributes this to the fact that the founders' divergence on the religion question prompted their convergence on
the jurisdiction question. Adopting a purely jurisdictional First
Amendment promised the best of all worlds: each state could answer the religion question however it saw fit.6
This is certainly a plausible interpretation of the historical
debate preceding the First Amendment's adoption.7 One may
attribute the substantive views of a certain founder or founders
to the religion clauses, but no one may reasonably argue that
there was complete consensus on matters of church and state.
Smith simply infers from this lack of consensus that the founders
resolved their dilemma by agreeing to disagree. Although the
lack of historical evidence makes it impossible to verify his hypothesis, it is easy to imagine the perceived appeal of deferring
all matters of religion and government to the states, where each
framer had a much greater chance of seeing his own perspective
prevail. Indeed, the very absence of recorded debate on the is4. Smith suggests that the drafters of the Massachusetts Constitution and Yale
President Timothy Dwight were among those who supported this position.
5. Smith places dissenting religious groups such as Baptists, and statesmen such as
James Madison, among those who embraced this "voluntarist" position.
6. Thus, Smith discounts originalism neither because it is impossible to ascertain
the original meaning of the religion clauses nor because it would be useless to do so.
Rather, he assumes both that their purpose is ascertainable and that knowing it would be
useful. The problem, Smith says, is that "we can discern what was probably their essential
meaning, and when we do so we discover that the religion clauses were purely jurisdictional in nature; they did not adopt any substantive right or principle of religious freedom." (p. 17)
7. It is not, however, the only plausible view. It is true that the fact that the First
Amendment would apply only to the federal government simplified the debate, because
those legislators who wanted to retain governmental power to do what the amendment
forbad knew that the amendment would not limit their state governments. But it does
not follow that the amendment has no substantive content, or even that the debate was
not principally about substantive content. Significantly, the limited recorded debate on
the Establishment Clause was about the meaning of establishment, not about the meaning
of federalism. People on both sides took the same position with respect to federal establishment that they took at home with respect to state establishments. See generally
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 906-10 (1986).
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sue makes Smith's argument all the more plausible.s Would the
founders readily have agreed to embodying a particular relation
of church and state in the Constitution without putting up a fight
for their own views? Hardly.
Smith's argument nonetheless invites certain responses.
First, it is hard to deny that the decision to leave substantive matters to the states was itself a substantive decision. Rephrasing the
religion clauses, interpreted as a jurisdictional provision, elucidates this point.
• Congress may neither establish religion nor prohibit its free
exercise.
• States may both establish religion and prohibit its free
exercise.
Read together, these clauses suggest an interaction of religion
and government in which the states have exclusive authority over
religion. Read independently, however, these clauses suggest a
relation of church and state in which religion is at once both amenable to and immune from government legislation. Considered
separately, the two provisions embody diametrically opposite
substantive positions on the proper relation between church and
state. Whereas the first clause contemplates a society in which
the government's power over religion is circumscribed, the second clause contemplates a society in which the government is
free to foster or fetter religion as deemed desirable. In other
words, we might say the founders adopted not one jurisdictional
provision, but two substantive provisions. Read as one provision,
it may be more natural to focus on the religion clauses' jurisdictional character; read as two provisions, their substantive attributes become quite clear. Thus, even accepting Smith's reading of
history, it is not entirely accurate to say the framers adopted a
"purely" jurisdictional provision.
Moreover, Smith fails to address the implications of his conclusion that the religion clauses are "purely" jurisdictional in nature.9 Assuming he is correct, it follows that courts should be
8. According to Smith, "if the enactors believed that they were not answering the
difficult questions at all but were merely deferring those questions to someone else-the
states-then the complacent and lackluster character of the discussion is entirely under·
standable." (p. 27) Judges and scholars have erred, he maintains, by resorting to "a twostep interpretive process. The first step has been to identify evidence of what one or more
of the framers or their contemporaries said or thought, not necessarily about the religion
clauses per se, but about the subject of religious freedom. The second step has been to
superimpose this opinion or view about religious freedom onto the religion clauses." (p.
46)
9. Although he acknowledges in Chapter 3 that "even a purely jurisdictional measure will necessarily impose substantive restrictions on one level of government to ensure
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able to interpret them correctly simply by applying basic principles of federal preemption law-in reverse. Under Smith's interpretation, that is, the religion clauses preclude the federal
government from acting in any manner that interferes with plenary state power over religion. This conclusion, however, raises
several questions Smith fails to answer: If the federal government
possesses no power over religion except that left to it by the
states, what constitutes an interference with state power? Are
there times when state measures impliedly "preempt" federal
legislation "respecting" religion?w If the states fail to "occupy
the field" and adopt a "hands off" approach as to matters of religion, is Congress free to legislate as it pleases?u
Suppose, for example, an early Congress enacted a draft
pursuant to its power to raise an army. Further suppose it
drafted clergymen and conscientious objectors such as Quakers.
In one respect Congress would simply be exercising its power
over federal military matters, but in another respect Congress
would be exercising jurisdiction over religion by forcing such
draftees to violate their religious obligations. Exempting clergymen and conscientious objectors would simply create a different
problem. At one level Congress would not be exercising jurisdiction over religion, but at another level Congress would be adopting an explicitly religious classification. Suppose an early
Congress subjected federal law to the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).12 Would any of these
enactments be constitutional?
In sum, Smith's conclusion that the religion clauses were primarily jurisdictional in nature does not obviate the need to determine their substantive scope. Rather, it simply creates new
interpretive questions; for even if one accepts that the religion
clauses have "no substantive meaning independent of their federalism," one must still determine their substantive meaning in
light of their federalism, and it remains the case that Congress
that the substantive area is left to a different level of government," (p. 43) Smith fails to
explore in any depth where those jurisdictional boundaries lie.
10. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop·
ment Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (state law can be preempted by congressional
occupation of a given field, which preempts any state law within the field, or, if Congress
has not occupied the field, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law).
11. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,256 (1984) (preemption should
be judged "on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state
standard or whether the imposition of a state standard ... would frustrate the objectives
of federal law").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). The Supreme Court recently invalidated RFRA as
applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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may "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. "13 In order to ensure that
Congress makes no law "respecting" religious establishments or
"prohibiting" religious free exercise, courts must first define
what it means to establish religion and to prohibit its free exercise. Then, and only then, can it enforce the jurisdictional limits
on Congress' power. Thus, if we follow Smith's argument to its
logical conclusion, it leads us back to square one and to his firstorder question: What is the proper relation between religion and
government?
II. SMITH'S THEORETICAL ARGUMENT: THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFECT NEUTRALITY
The second half of Foreordained Failure is devoted to
Smith's theoretical argument. An adequate general theory of
religious freedom is not possible, he argues, because all such theories founder on the following "basic theoretical conundrum":
The function of a theory of religious freedom is to mediate
among a variety of competing religious and secular positions
and interests, or to explain how government ought to deal with
these competing positions and interests. To perform that function, however, the theory will tacitly but inevitably privilege,
or prefer in advance, one of those positions while rejecting or
discounting others. But a theory that privileges one of the
competing positions and rejects others a priori is not truly a
theory of religious freedom at ali-or, at least, it is not the sort
of theory that modern proponents of religious freedom have
sought to develop. (p. 63) (emphasis added)

At first glance, it appears that the final phrase in this passage
is sort of an afterthought. As one reads on, however, it becomes
clear that it is central to Smith's thesis. That is, Smith is not simply contending that the idea of a theory of religious freedom is
impossible. Such theories abound and are ready subjects of criticism. Rather, Smith is arguing that a genuinely neutral theory of
13.

A review of the 28 free exercise cases decided by the Supreme Court since

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), which incorporated the Free Exercise
Clause, reveals that 13 (roughly 46%) involved challenges to federal law and 15 involved
challenges to state laws. A review of the 51 establishment cases decided since Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947}, which incorporated the Establishment Clause, reveals
that seven (roughly 14%} involved challenges to federal law and 44 involved challenges to
state law.
Ironically, if the religion clauses were in fact intended as a purely jurisdictional measure, incorporating them into the Fourteenth Amendment not only distorted their original meaning, but "effectively repudiated-and hence repealed" them. (p. 49)
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religious freedom is not possible-a conclusion that, he contends,
necessarily renders the entire notion of a comprehensive and adequate theory of religious freedom incoherent. As the author
states in a later passage:
[T]heories of religious freedom seek to reconcile or to mediate
among competing religious and secular positions within a society, but those competing positions disagree about the very
background beliefs on which a theory of religious freedom
must rest. One religion will maintain beliefs about theology,
government, and human nature that may support a particular
version of religious freedom. A different religion or a secular
viewpoint will support different background beliefs that logically generate different views or theories of religious freedom.
In adopting a theory of religious freedom that is consistent
with some background beliefs but not with others, therefore,
government ... must adopt, or privilege, one of the competing
secular or religious positions. Yet this adopting or prefering of
one religious or secular position over its competitors is precisely what modern theories of religious freedom seek to
avoid. Hence, theories of religious freedom can function only
by implicitly betraying their own objective. (p. 68) (emphasis
added)
In Smith's terminology, all theories of religious freedom impermissibly grant certain religious or secular perspectives a "preferred position." (p. 71) Accordingly, in one-by-one fashion he
dismisses the various modem theories of religious libertyi4 on
the ground that they "tacitly but inevitably ... prefer in advance"
(p. 63) one or more "beliefs concerning matters of religion and
theology, the proper role of government, and 'human nature,'"
(p. 63) (footnote omitted) and thus "implicitly betray[] their own
objective" (p. 68) of treating those perspectives neutrally.
Smith's observations about neutrality are unlike most other
discussions of the subject. Theorists too many to number have
criticized this or that theory of religious freedom on the ground
that it unduly burdens or favors a certain religion or religion in
general. Apparently Smith has no quarrel with most of these
theorists, for much of what he says is perfectly consistent with
their criticisms. Yet Smith goes well beyond the claim that certain individual theories are, as applied, unfaithful to their de14. In Chapter Seven, entitled The Pursuit of Neutrality, Smith critiques seven such
theories on the ground that they fail the test of true neutrality: Neutral Application (pp.
78-7~); Neutrality as Nondiscrimination (pp. 79-81); Secularism as Neutrality (pp. 81-84);
A Tnchotomy of Values (pp. 84-88); The "Common Denominator" Approach (pp. 88-90);
Symbolic Neutrality (pp. 90-93); and Neutrality as a Matter of Degree (pp. 93-96).
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dared objective of neutrality. He instead focuses on an entirely
different respect in which theories of religious freedom are nonneutral-at the level of their "selection of background beliefs or
premises." (p. 99) Because the very assumptions upon which
any theory of religious liberty will rest-no matter what those
assumptions are-inevitably grant priority status to some conception of religion, Smith postulates that such theories necessarily
cannot achieve neutrality. In short, he advances the more farreaching claim that neutrality is simply impossible, and reasons
that generating and applying theories of religious freedom is
therefore a hopeless enterprise that should be abandoned.Is
To respond adequately to Smith's theoretical argument
would require more than a book review, so I intend only to suggest some of the limits of his theory in the form of two questions.
The first question-Is Neutrality Possible?-inquires whether
Smith's theoretical argument is descriptively accurate. The second question-Is Neutrality Desirable?-explores the normative
implications of his argument, namely, if neutrality isn't possible,
or at least isn't possible in all circumstances, is that necessarily a
bad thing?

Question One: Is Neutrality Possible?
As a descriptive matter, Smith's theoretical argument has
much to commend it. Assumptions about human nature, about
the proper role of religion in society, and about the legitimate
scope of government clearly inform every theory of religious liberty. As Smith observes, such theories are not created "ex
nihilo."I6 (p. 63) Rather, their effectiveness depends upon the
validity of the background assumptions upon which they rest.I7
To cite an easy example, a theory that assumes religious persuasion is a matter of one's free will is of questionable validity from
the perspective of those who understand themselves as
predestined to hold their religious worldview and act in accordance therewith.1s
15. Smith advances this claim primarily in Chapters Five and Nine (the Afterward).
16. Smith states that "an account of religious freedom that was simply asserted and
not justified by reference to supporting premises would be mere fiat, and hence could
hardly be counted as a theory at all." (p. 67)
17. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 115, 188 (1992) ("[I]n the context of government speech-unlike regulation and
spending-neutrality is an unattainable ideal. Whenever the government communicates
to the people, it will favor some ideas and oppose others." (footnote omitted)).
18. Cf. id. at 125 ("It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he
has 'selected the day of the week in which to refrain from labor,' since the Jewish people
have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that this choice was made by God."
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Smith is also correct to suggest that theories of religious
freedom that aspire toward neutrality are likely to betray that
objective in practice. A theory of formal neutrality, for example,
will likely grant a "preferred position" to mainstream religions,
just as a theory that contemplates exemptions from generally applicable laws will likely grant a preferred position to those
outside the mainstream. Indeed, virtually any government act toward religion may be characterized as non-neutral in some respect. Whether an observer perceives a particular state action as
neutral will simply depend upon the vantage point, or baseline, 19
she adopts. Consider, for example, the variety of public reactions
to the Court's decisions on teaching evolution in the schools.
Those whose religious beliefs are contrary to the theory of evolution understandably perceive its being taught in the public
schools as hostile to their beliefs. Yet those whose beliefs are
contrary to the teachings of creationism would be equally justified in perceiving its addition to the curriculum, if that were permitted, as hostile to their beliefs. Cases involving public use of
religious symbols, such as a creche or menorah, illustrate the
same point. The state's use of such symbols may reasonably be
perceived as an endorsement of religion. Yet court decisions requiring their removal from public places may reasonably be perceived as government disapproval of religion.zo (p. 114) In
short, whether a government act is neutral toward religion is relative, and it is unrealistic to suppose that government can be neutral toward religion in every respect.
But to say that neutrality is sometimes illusory is not to say
that it is always illusory. And although Smith persuasively argues that neutrality is often elusive, he ignores important aspects
of current doctrine that can and do avoid privileging certain religious positions from the outset. Neutrality-even at the level of
background beliefs and assumptions-is possible in limited circumstances, and these circumstances indicate that Smith is wrong
{footnote omitted) {quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
19. Cf. Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 68-92 (Harv. U. Press, 1993); Douglas
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 {1986); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive,
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1002 {1990); McConnell, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 155, 173-79 (cited in note 17).
20. "The Court simply takes no account ... of the alienation ... that many persons
~eel toward a government that they perceive as indifferent or hostile to religion, and that
1s hkely to be aggravated by the results of the 'no endorsement' version of religious freedom." (footnote omitted). (p. 114)
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to say neutrality is always an unattainable goal. I offer just one
by way of illustration.
Consider a well-established principle of the Supreme
Court's free exercise doctrine, namely that courts may pass on
the sincerity, but not on the validity, of a claimant's religious doctrine.zt Several background assumptions inform this principle.
One such assumption is that courts are ill-equipped to act as authorities in spiritual matters; another is that, even if judges were
competent theologians, religious belief is sufficiently important
that people are entitled to form their own religious opinions,
even if they seem wrongheaded to the government or to the majority of society. In consequence, the proper meaning and scope
of religious belief is left to the claimant.22
Whatever its merits, this aspect of church-state "theory"
does not grant a "preferred position" to a particular conception
of religion. Rather, it avoids precisely that difficulty by deferring
the role of defining the proper scope of religious belief to the
claimant. As a result, the state is limited to determining when
the interests of the community are more important than the
claimant's interest in the free exercise of her faith. Although this
sort of balancing burdens some religious claimants more than
others, and thus is not neutral in application, it is neutral in the
sense of the word that Smith finds unattainable.
This aspect of current doctrine does not form a complete
theory of religious liberty, but it demonstrates that Smith goes
too far in arguing that the "background assumptions" upon
which all theories of religious liberty rest can never be neutral.
But even assuming neutrality is never attainable, does it necessarily follow that the entire notion of a theory of religious freedom is incoherent? The answer must be "No"-unless, of course,
neutrality is the underlying purpose of the religion clauses, and
21. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is
to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his
work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.").
22. For an insightful discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this aspect of the
Court's doctrine, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. Ct.
Rev. I, 15:
[R]eligious claims-if true-are prior to and of greater dignity than the claims of
the state. If there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends the authority of
nations; that, in part, is what we mean by 'God.' For the state to maintain that its
authority is in all matters supreme would be to deny the possibility that a transcendent authority could exist. Religious claims thus differ from secular moral
claims both because the state is constitutionally disabled from disputing the
truth of the religious claim and because it cannot categorically deny the authority on which such a claim rests.
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not simply an approximation for achieving a more fundamental
purpose such as the separation of church and state, the establishment of a secular public order, or the accommodation of religion.
Smith apparently assumes that neutrality is the driving force behind the religion clauses, for when he concludes that neutrality is
unattainable, he declares that theorizing about religious liberty
must be abandoned.23
Question Two: Is Neutrality Desirable?
Smith rightly observes that many modem theories of religious liberty-and the Supreme Court's own religion clause doctrine-aspire toward "neutrality."24 (p. 77) Indeed, the term
itself seems to have become the mantra of the religion clauses.
Thus, it is somewhat disconcerting to think that neutrality might
not even be possible, and Smith's contentions at first appear
quite damning.
Upon further reflection, however, it is somewhat surprising
that "neutrality" has become the byword of the religion clauses.
The First Amendment itself singles out religion from other philosophies and ideologies,2s and few take seriously the proposition
that government may not in any way take religion qua religion
into account, either for special advantage or disadvantage.26 At
times religion is entitled to special protection; at times it is placed
at an apparent disadvantage. The issue, therefore, is not whether
government may take religion into account, but when, how, and
for what purposes. If being "neutral" toward religion means that
the government must always treat it like everything else, then
23. Smith assumes that in making the case against perfect neutrality, he has also
made the case for abandoning neutrality entirely. In so doing, he commits the fallacy of
the excluded middle. The more sensible third alternative, of course, is to redefine neutrality so that it reinforces and implements liberty. See Laycock, 39 DePaul L. Rev. at 100102 (cited in note 19} (defining "substantive neutrality" as minimizing incentives to change
religious behavior); Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1989) (advocating a similar
approach in economic terms).
24. Quoting Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Doctrine, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 817,818 (1984) ("That in some sense the federal government and the
states ought to be 'neutral' in religious matters is undisputed.").
25. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (White, J., dissenting) ("It cannot
be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious classification.").
26. See generally Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 83; Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 329, 331-32 (1991).
[T]he Constitution treats religious belief differently-sometimes better, sometimes worse, depending on whether the context is one of interference or advancement. The unifying principle is that the religious life of the people should
be _insulated, to the maximum possible degree, from the effect of governmental
actton, whether favorable or unfavorable. To extend this principle to all other
beliefs and activities would be impossible.
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making neutrality the focus of religion clause doctrine is plainly
both undesirable and doctrinally mistaken.
Unfortunately, Smith perpetuates the mistaken assumption
that neutrality is the be-all, end-all of the relation of church and
state, rather than a commonly useful means of promoting the end
of religious liberty. As Michael McConnell has observed, "[i]t is
sometimes forgotten that religious liberty is the central value and
animating purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. "27 Neutrality, like the principle of separation, is no more
than an approximation for religious liberty: sometime it advances
religious liberty, less often it does not, but it is not a substitute
for maximizing religious liberty. Accordingly, it may sometimes
be desirable to deviate from the goal of neutrality to achieve the
more fundamental purpose of advancing religious freedom.zs
And if violations of neutrality are "precisely what modem theories of religious freedom seek to avoid," (p. 68) perhaps the theorists ought to rethink their objective.
III
If the First Amendment embodies no substantive principle
of religious freedom, and if the very enterprise of generating
such a principle is incoherent, American judges and scholars
have indeed embarked on a "hopeless quest," (p. 120) and
Smith's book is aptly entitled Foreordained Failure. Yet one
might ask, "Where does that leave us?"
Smith avoids offering anything more than "general and very
tentative" (p. vi) conjectures about such questions, noting that
the objective of the book is not "to answer normative questions,"
but simply "to clarify our situation by trying to explore the nature and sources of our current confusion." (p. 121) Accordingly, he suggests only that such normative questions will be
"troublesome" until we reconsider the basis of "two background
assumptions" that inform our current system: first, "that judicial
review must be based on something called 'principle"'; and second, "that the courts necessarily have an essential and central
role to play in the realization and protection of religious freedom." (p. 122)
27. McConnell, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 22).
28. Alternatively, we might simply redefine neutrality so that it maximizes religious
freedom. See note 23, supra. Because the term is malleable, however, and because the
courts have not adhered to a consistent definition of neutrality, it may be more desirable
simply to abandon the term altogether.
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One of the ironies in Smith's modest stated objective is that
the normative implications of his arguments are anything but
modest. Not only does rethinking these two assumptions follow
naturally from Smith's arguments, but, taken seriously, it is hard
to imagine what alternative but abandoning judicial review of
church and state would solve the dilemmas he poses.29
Smith notes that we might keep judicial review but base it on
something other than principle, such as history or tradition, but
one wonders why courts would be any better equipped to conduct such a review than other citizens knowledgable about "history" and "tradition." Moreover, it is hard to take Smith
seriously when he suggests keeping judicial review, but basing it
on something other than principle. In fact, it is hard to imagine
how any method of resolving debates concerning the proper relation between government and religion could avoid "degenerating" into an application of "principles" to the subject problems.
Nor is the idea of using tradition and history to enlighten our
perspective far removed from the notion of "precedent."
Suppose, for example, we assigned juries of average citizens,
unconstrained by the Constitution, the role of deciding whether
and how given church-state problems should be solved. Could
we seriously expect them to come to any resolutions without applying their own notions-i.e., principles-of what is just? If they
looked to historical evidence of how past generations solved similar problems, is that so very different from a court's application
of precedent? And if we could not expect them to act in accordance with their own notions of just principles and fair sense of
the lessons of history, can it seriously be contended that such a
system would advance religious liberty? We can speculate that
the result would often be a form of majoritarianism incompatible
with our history and tradition or, worse, religious persecution.3o
Indeed, it might be said that the reason present church-state the29. A second irony in Foreordained Failure is the fact that, if Smith's arguments
correctly suggest we should abandon judicial review of church and state, that result is,
according to Smith's reading of history, just the result the framers would have desired.
30. Cf. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 15:
Legislators are under no obligation to be principled. Subject only to their oath
to uphold the Constitution, they are free to reflect majority prejudices, to respond to the squeakiest wheel among minorities, to trade votes and make compromises, and to ignore problems that have no votes in them. This political
freedom is good for many things, but it is not good for achieving even-handed
tr~at~e.nt of many small, disparate, and sometimes odd or obnoxious religious
mmontles: Judges are far from perfect, but they are sworn to do equal justice to
all, to ~ec1de every case presented to them, and to treat like cases alike. They
are obhged by precedent and accepted judicial norms to give principled reasons
for their decisions.
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ory has failed is precisely because courts have been too pragmatic, too unprincipled, too ad hoc, and too majoritarian.
Professor Smith does not address many of the questions left
burning at the end of Foreordained Failure. He fails to say how
he would resolve the interpretive problems created by his historical argument, and he elects to give only a brief discussion of the
practical implications of his theoretical argument. Yet these are
not tragic flaws in his effort. Smith's historical argument is
powerfully presented, and he makes a valuable effort "to clarify
our situation by trying to explore the nature and sources of our
current confusion." (p. 121) Although Smith is wrong to suggest
that the elusive nature of "neutrality" renders the process of theorizing about religious liberty hopeless, he nicely ferrets out and
critiques the background assumptions that inform modern theories of religious freedom. His book is insightful, original, and
foreordained to succeed.

JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION. Edited by Warren F.
Schwartz.t New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995.
Pp. 246. Cloth, $49.95.
Hiroshi Motomura2

Immigration law reduces to a few basic but difficult questions. Should we restrict entry by outsiders? If so, what principles guide those restrictions? And after a newcomer arrives,
when is she no longer a "newcomer," but one of "us"? These
three questions are deceptively simple when so phrased, but they
are the core issues of law and policy. We should keep them in
sharp focus, the mind-numbing complexity of the Immigration
and Nationality Act notwithstanding.
We can answer these questions from different perspectives.
One perspective involves policymaking through legislative and
administrative processes. This is, of course, the staple diet of the
Senate and House immigration subcommittees, as well as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Executive Office of
Immigration Review, and other administrative bodies. Our three
basic questions inform decisionmaking at this level, but inevita1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
2. Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder. I would
like to thank Linda Bosniak and Carol Lehman for their thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts, and Hans-Joachim Cremer for guidance on matters of German law.

